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The aim of this dissertation is to explain how the Three Principles of Arms Exports, a set of 
internal rules outlined by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), came to be seen as 
constitutional principles from 1945 to 1983. Previous research has explained that the principles were 
formed by norms such as “Pacifism” and “Antimilitarism” from constructivists’ perspectives. This 
research attempts to use those previous analyses to form an explanation for the historical policy 
change of the principles. In the 1950’s, Japan exported guns and ammunition to Thailand, Burma, 
Taiwan, Brazil, South Vietnam, and Indonesia. At that time the government considered expanding the 
defense industry into an export industry. However, the Ministry of Finance interrupted this policy 
formation process by demanding a balanced defense budget. Prime Minister Eisaku Satō originally 
created the principles in 1967 under political pressure from the Diet. Sato proposed the principles that 
banned the Japanese government from arms trade with (1)Communist bloc countries, (2) countries 
subject to "arms" exports embargo under the United Nations Security Council's resolutions, and (3) 
countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In 1976, Prime Minister Takeo 
Miki submitted a statement, which is widely known as the Unified View of the Government to the 
House of Representatives’ Budget Committee. This statement confirmed the nation’s pledge to “not 
permit the export of arms to countries or regions barred by the Three Principles” and “to refrain from 
exporting arms to other areas not included in the Three Principles in conformity with the spirit of the 
Japanese Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act”. Thus, the principles became 
an official policy, which banned arms export. The review of these principles took place amid rapid 
economic and technological development in Japan. In the latter half of the 1970’s, the United States 
began to issue policies that called on its allies to share military technology. During this time, the 
Japanese industry had developed major technological advancement in the defense sector. Through 
negotiation with U.S., the Japanese government attempted to agree on a compromise between the 
principles and in order to cooperated with its U.S. ally. A Cabinet Meeting in 1983 approved the 
transfer of arms technology to the U.S., which was dependent upon the Japan-US Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement. The result of this study reveals that the Japanese security policy was formed 
during policy processes at the domestic and international level by historical descriptions. These 
findings demonstrate that it is not enough to focus on the relations between norm and policy to 
explain the principles as previous research had assumed. The characteristics of the principles cannot 
be recognized as a consequence of compromise among exclusive political interests. 
 
